"The Dawkins Delusion" by Alister McGrath with Joanna Collicutt McGrath (SPCK, 2007)

This short book (it packs a lot into its 65 pages) attacks the arguments and approach of Dawkins' "The God Delusion". The author got a science Ph.D while an atheist, but ended up being an Oxford theology professor.

The nature of religion

• On p.8 he says that "Belief in God is actually assumed by Aquinas, rather than proved."
• He points out that "the dividing line between a world view and a religion is notoriously imprecise and, many would say, is constructed by those with vested interests to defend". Amongst the non-religious world-views he lists are "Buddhism, Existentialism, Islam, atheism and Marxism".
• He quotes Feuerbach, who suggested that people project or objectify their longings and call this 'God'.
• He points out that "both Dawkins and Dennett adopt a very cognitive view of religion, defining it virtually exclusively in terms of 'belief in God'. Yet this is certainly not the sole aspect of religion; nor is it even necessarily the most fundamental. A more reliable description of religion would make reference to its many aspects, including [] ritual practices, social affiliation" (p.29)
• "Dogmas are not only propositional; they arise in a social context and fulfil a social function [] They can be thought of as group identity markers [] They survive in part for reasons of affiliation and conservatism [] People may be prepared to assent to propositional contradictions (renaming them 'paradoxes') and counterfactual belief statements (renaming them 'mysteries') precisely because the cognitive processes associated with their personal religion is not taking place at this level at all" (p.37)
• He points out that religions critique other (or, as in the Bible, their own) religions.
• "If religion were to cease to exist, other social demaracators would emerge as decisive, some of which would become transcendentalized in due course" (p.52)
• On p.52 he writes that "the ideals of liberty or equality ... now become quasi-divine authorities, which none are permitted to challenge"
• "humans are capable of both violence and moral excellence - and that both these may be provoked by world views, whether religious or otherwise" (p.49)
• He points out that people use religion (a higher authority) to justify their actions even if they don't believe.

Dawkins

• He writes that Dawkins "appears to have made the transition from a scientist with a passionate concern for truth to a crude anti-religious propagandist who shows a disregard for evidence" (p.27)

• He thinks that there are "many points at which The God Delusion depends on discarded nineteenth-century assumptions to make a twenty-first-century case against religion" (p.34)

• "Dawkins appears to have made the transition from a scientist with a passionate concern for truth to a crude anti-religious propagandist who shows a disregard for evidence", (p.27)
• "The God Delusion seems more designed to reassure atheists whose faith is faltering than to engage fairly or rigourously with religious believers and others seeking for truth" (p.63)
• On p.8 he says that Dawkins' knowledge of theology is very partial and shallow, which I can believe. Then he writes that "a central theme of the Christian faith [is that God gave] humanity the wonderful gift of salvation without demanding they do something for him first". When I read such phrases I'm baffled. I try in vain to translate it into terms I understand. In what sense "gift"?
• I can easily believe that Dawkins didn't check his facts carefully. In his situation I wouldn't bother attacking attempted proofs that gods exist. McGrath rebuffs his attacks. Straw men attacking straw men. Of course the methods and techniques employed may be of interest. It's a shame that the effort wasn't applied on something more useful.
• Dawkins idea that the "God-meme" has a "high survival value, or infective power" sounds fanciful and doesn't account for the scale of the infestation.
• Dawkins' section on the Evils of Religion sounds weak.

Science and Religion

• He quotes a survey run in 1916 where active scientists were asked if they believed in a god to whom one may pray in expectation of receiving an answer. 40% said they did. The same question was asked in 1997, and much the same results were obtained.
• He writes that "Most unbelieving scientists of my acquaintance are atheists on grounds other than their science" (p.21)
• He thinks (p.15) Dawkins believes that "Science will explain everything - including why some people still believe in such a ridiculous idea as God." He suggests on p.17 that "there are many questions that, by their very nature, must be recognized to lie beyond the legitimate scope of the scientific method, as this is normally understood. For example: Is there purpose within nature? Dawkins regards this as a spurious non-question. Yet this is hardly an illegitimate question for human beings to ask, or to hope to have answered.". "Why me?" might be asked by a young person given a terminal prognosis. It's a natural question to ask, but there may be no answer.

• On p.12 he points out that Richard Swinburne "asserts that the intelligibility of the universe itself needs explanation". I don't see a problem. We've evolved to survive in this universe, so we're tuned to understand this world. There may be other universes that didn't survive because the fundamentals were contradictory.

• I think religion makes so few points that science can challenge, that the two don't seem much in opposition. When they are, religion usually backs down.

Psychology and religion

• He writes that "Dawkins argues [] that the psychological processes that predispose us to religion (however defined) confer selective advantage in other areas of life. Religion has no selective advantage in its own right". McGrath then makes the point that multiple causes are the norm in the human sciences, so even were Dawkins right, God can still be a contributing or even underlying factor to religious feelings. Yes, true, this argument doesn't rule out God. What argument could?
• He claims that when natural explanations are given of the origins of belief in God, "this is a circular argument, which presupposes its conclusions. It begins from the assumption that there is no God, and then proceeds to show that an explanation of God can be offered which is entirely consistent with this". I don't see this as a circular argument.
• I think God's as much a delusion as the Self is, generated by the same brain mechanisms. Self-awareness is rather mysterious. We are more than the sum of our parts. It's not an all-or-nothing sensation. Some disorders affect it. A few animals seem to have it. Intelligence seems a prerequisite but doesn't guarantee it - mountain gorillas (who live much of the time alone) fail the standard tests. It's a useful feature. Universal. Important to us.

I've not read Dawkins' book. Judging by this book it seems to use science in an attempt to refute God, and mocks believers, even going so far to say that religion is dangerous and shouldn't be taught to children. I think such refutation attempts are doomed. After more than a century of evolution theory gaining respectability, many people in the world still believe alternatives. That said, God has retreating from the action. The eye, once considered by many a disproof of evolution, may have been developed in over a dozen ways by different beasts. Physically too, God has retreated as science reaches out. He's no longer hundreds of miles beneath our feet, or on a distant mountain top.

On p.viii McGrath compares Dawkins' dogmatism with religious fundamentalism. I think that big claims (e.g. that God exists) demand big evidence. Surely though, billions of believers is evidence enough, and as he points out on p.viii, belief is on the up after a dip in the 1960s. The US may well have more believers than it's ever had. If God is a delusion it's a mass delusion.

Belief comes in many forms though. Trump's God and a Buddhist's belief have little in common. A modern Christian theologian's concept of religion is little like that of a medieval (or even contemporary) European peasant for whom religion provided structure, daily habits, festivals, education, and hope. The author mocks the naivity of Dawkins' crude comparison of God with Santa Claus or the Tooth Fairy. An adult believing in Santa Claus would indeed be infantile, but the idea that living virtuously (even sacrificing pleasures) merits a reward seems strong in both young and old. And who's to say there isn't a real Santa Claus somewhere, behind the glitter, the candles and the charlatans. I couldn't refute the claim.

On p.11 he quotes Dawkins - "one of the truly bad effects of religion is that it teaches us that it is a virtue to be satisfied with not understanding" then points out that "After all, there is nothing wrong with admitting limits to our understanding". My guess that Dawkins has in mind those who tackle adversity by claiming that "it is the will of god" and do nothing.

I don't think there are gods, souls, ghosts, afterlife or lucky charms. But the religious people I know are good people. Some of the past's greatest minds have expressed themselves in theology - there's much to learn from their works. Political/society notions of justice derive from such thought. Religious bodies do a lot of good work, feeding the poor, etc.

Should one respect others' beliefs? What should we do with people who stop their kids having life-saving blood transfusions? Should one try to be kind to people who hallucinate or should we try to help them? If they're harmless and happy why not let them be?

Other reviews

• New Scientist